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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
BANKRUF'l'CY-A.PPOINT.MENT OF Rr:cr:rvr:R AS Ac:r OF BANKRUPTCY.-An in-
solvent corporation, against which a creditors' suit was brought in the state 
court, procured the appointment of a receiver therein by an answer and cross 
bill in the name of its president, who was a defendant, and who with one 
other stockholder owned the majority of the stock and controlled the cor-
poration. Held, that the corporation applied for the appointment of a re-
ceiver within the meaning of §3a(4) of the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r, making such 
application, while insolvent, an act of bankruptcy; it being unnecessary that 
the application be by a bill or cross bill filed in the name of the corporation. 
Graham Mfg. Co. v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 238 Fed. 488. 
Though the debtor himself must make application, in case of corporations 
it is not always requisite that there be a formal declaration by the corpora-
tion, if the application for a receiver is substantially the act of the corpora-
tion; where those so applying control the corporation and especially where 
there is an attempt to evade the bankruptcy law, Esploration Co. v. Pacific Co., 
177 Fed. 825, 839, 101 C. C. A. 39; James SupplJ• and Hdwe. Co. v. Dayton 
Coal & Iron Co., 223 Fed. 991, 139 C. C. A. 367; In re Maplecroft Mills, 218 
Fed. 659, 673; Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. Sadler Lusk Trading Co., 200 
Fed. 813, even though the laws of the state court do not autho.rize such 
application, Exploration Co. v. Pacific Co., supra. It is immaterial that re-
ceivership was not ordered because of insolvency if the corporation was 
actually insolvent. fames Hdw. Co. v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., supra; Hill 
v. Electric Co., 214 !"ed. 243, 130 C. C. A. 613. 
BANKRUP'tCY-STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDER AS PROVABLr: DEBT.-
A discharge in bankruptcy was pleaded as a defense to a suit against the 
shareholders of an insolvent corporation under a New York statute making 
them "individually responsible, equally and ratably, for all contracts, debts 
and engagements of such corporation to the extent of the amount of their 
stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in 
such shares." Under §63 of the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r debts founded upon a 
contract, expressed or implied, are provable in bankruptcy. §14 provides for 
the discharge of provable debts. Held, that the iiability was contractual, 
provable, and the discharge was a good defense. Van Tuyl v. Schwab, et al., 
164 N. Y. Supp-. 
Under most statutes such liability is held to arise out of an implied con-
tract and to accrue before the corporation becomes insolvent. Platt v. Wilmot, 
193 U. S. 613, 24 Sup. Ct. 542, 48 L. ~d. Sag; Whitman v. Oxford National 
Bank, 176 U. S. 559; Nimick v. Mingo Iron Wks. Co., 25 W. Va., 184; 
Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed. g61. In many cases, however, the 
statutory liability is made a penalty for some misdeed, e. g., failure by the 
president or corporation to file a certificate showing amount of stock paid in. 
iVoods v. f,Vicks, 7 Lea. 40; Sayles v. Brown, 40 Fed. 8. However, Marshall 
v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 42 N. E. 419, 3.4 L. R. A. 757, 51 Am. St. Rep. 654, 
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is to be distihguished from the principal case. In that case the court ex-
pressly declared the cause of action to be contractual, but refused to sustain 
~tin New York against stockholders of a Kansas corporation. 
BANKRUPTCY-STAYING AN ACTION PENDING IN STATE COURT.-§ II (a) of 
the BANKRUPTCY ACT provides that a suit founded upon a claim from which 
a. discharge in bankruptcy would be a release and pending against a person 
at the time of the filing of the petition shall be stayed until after an adjudica-
tion or dismissal of the petition, and that if such person is adjudged a bank-
rupt, such action may be fµrther· stayed until twelve months after the date of 
adjudication, etc. H cld, that suit in the state court should have been stayed 
.till after adjudication. Anders Bros. v. Latimer, (Ala. I9I7), 73 So. 925. 
Held, that whetlier the action is to be further stayed after an adjudication 
is to be determined by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion. Smith 
v. Miller, {Mass. I9I7), n5 N. £. 243. 
Held, that the state court is not deprived of its jurisdiction by the stay, and 
may proceed after adjudication. Brazil v. Azevedo, (Cal. App. I9I6), I62 Pac. 
1049. 
Because of the use of the word "shall" in the first part of §n (a) and of 
"may'' in the second part, these three recent cases agree that till after adj udi-
cation a stay shall be granted as of right, but that thereafter the state court 
can exercise its discretion. Other ~ses to the same effect are Rosenthal v. 
N ove, I75 Mass. 559, 503, 56 N. E. 884, 886; In re Gunacevi Tunnel Co., 20I 
Fed. 3I6, u9 C. C. A. 554. Only suits founded on claims provable and dis-
chargeable are stayed under §n (a). In re Macauley, IOI Fed. 223; Imbria11i 
v. Anderson, 76 N. H. 49I, 84 At!. 974. Those to which a discharge is not 
a release are not stayed, such as suits to require ~orporations to issue stock, 
suits based on fraud, or to recover fines imposed by state courts, etc. In re 
Clipper Mfg. Co., I79 Fed. 843; In re Wallack, I20 Fed. 5I6; In re Cole, 
106 Fed. 837; or suits in state courts to assert rights in rem, Tennessee 
Marble· Co. v. Grant, I35 Fed. 322, I4 A. ·B. R. 288; United Wireless Co., 
I92 Fed. 238. Even though the suit is commenced after the filing of the 
petition, it must be stayed as of right till after adjudication. In re Basch, 
97 F:ed. 76I. 
BANKRUPTCY-TRUSTEE'S RIGHTS UNDER UNRECORDED CONDITIONAL SALE.-
Under· §62. of the PERSONAL PROPERTY i:,AW of New York ( CoNSOL. LA ws, 
c. 4I), providing that all conditio~s in a conditional sale contract, accom-
panied by delivery of the godds reserving title in the vendor, shall be void 
as against subsequent purchasers, pledgees or mortgagees in good faith, unless 
recorded, an unrecorded condit:ronal sale contract is valid against the creditors 
of the buyer. §47a(2) of tbe BANKRUPTCY ACT gives to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy the rights, remedies and powers of lien creditors. Held, that the 
trustee in bankruptcy acquired no rights to the goods. J.Iergeathaler Linotype 
Co. v. Hull, 239 Fed. 26. 
§47a(2) as amended in I9IO confers upon the trustee the rights which the 
bankrupt or any credito.r posses~ed at the time of filing the petition. Potter 
Mfg. Co. v. Arthur, 220 Fed. 843, 136 C. C. A. 589, Ann. Cas. I9I6A I268; 
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In re Floyd-Scott Co., 224 Fed. 987. But as the reserved title of the condi-
tional vendor was valid as to creditors of the vendee, the trustee had no 
right to retain the property. Other cases arising under the same New York 
statute and decided in the same manner are In re I. S. Remsen Mfg. Co., 
227 Fed. 207; fo re White's Express· Co., 215 Fed. 8g4 Where the condi-
tions in an unrecorded conditional sale are void as to creditors, the trustee 
is entitled to the goods. In re Roellich, 223 Fed. 687; Augusta Grocery Co. 
v. So11. Moline Plow Co., 213 Fed. 786, 130 C. C. A. 444; In re Franklin 
Lumber Co., 187 Fed. 281. Where the conditions are void only as to creditors 
fastening liens or taking out execution on the property, the right to fasten 
them or levy execution passes to the trustee. Potter Mfg. Co. \'. Arthur, 
220 Fed. 843; In re Gehris-Herbilie Co., 188 Fed: 502. The trustee, even where 
he acquires no rights to the goods, may, with the approval of the court, pay 
the amount due and retain the property. In re Wegmaa Piano Co., 221 
Fed. 128. 
BANKS AND BANKING-SECURITIES SUBJECT To BANKER'S LIEN.-A retail 
monument dealer deposited his customers' contracts with his manufacturer 
as security for the orders. The manufacturer deposited them with the de-
fendant bank for collection. In a suit by the trustee in bankruptcy of the 
manufacturer to recover the proceeds of the contracts after collection, held, 
the contracts are paper securities within the rule that a banker has a lien 
for a general balance due him on all securities deposited wiil'l him for collec-
tion. Goodwin v. Barre Sav. & Trust Co., (Vt. 1917), 100 At!. 34 
It has long been settled that a banker who has advanced money to another 
has a general lien on funds of the latter in his hands for the amount of his 
general balance unless such were delivered to him under a particular agree-
ment limiting their application. Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 
1 How. 234; Sweeny v. Easter, I Wall. 166; Barnett v. Brandao, 6 M. & G. 
630. The theory is that the possession of the securities or the expectation of 
possession leads to the extension of credit by the bank. Reynes v. Dumont, 
130 U. S. 354; Gibbons v. Hecox, 105 Mich. 509·. Just what property in the 
possession of the banker is subject to this general lien does not appear to 
have been so definitely decided. It is clear that it attaches to deposits and 
ordinary commereial paper, Joyce v. A1tten, 179 U. S. 591, 45 L. ed. 332;-
Wpod v. Bank, 129 Mass. 358; and this extends to commercial paper left with 
the bank for collection, Joyce v. Auten, supra, Garrison v. Trust Co., 139 
Mich. 392, 102 N. W. 978; but a bank has no such lien on securities accidentally 
in its possession, Bank v. Gatton, 172 Ill. 625, nor on packages left for safe 
keeping, Leese v. Martin, L. R 17 Eq. 224; Ex Parte Eyre, l Ph. 227. In 
Ba1ik of Metropolis v. New England Bank, supra, the rule was stated to be 
that the lien attached to all "paper securities" and this has been approved by 
other cases although the courts in each case were dealing with commercial 
paper. Lehman Bros. v. Mfg. Co., 64 Ala. 567; Bank v. Hanson, 34 Neb. 
455, 51 N. W. 1035· In Tufts v. Bank & Trust Co., 59 N. J. L. 38o, 35 At!. 
792, it was held that the lien attached to the proceeds of a paper in the form 
of a promissory note, but invalid as such. The court in the instant case 
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reasons that since the theory of the law is that the bank extends credit on 
the expectation that such paper will come into its possession from time to 
•time and be available as a security for balances due, and since contracts 
such as are involved in that case are often used as security, modern business 
methods demand that any business paper that may be the basis of this credit 
shall be included under the tc;rm "paper securities" in the rule above stated; 
and be subject to the lien. This reasoning would seem to be logicaily as 
well as economically correct. 
Brr.r.s AND Notts-W_.\J.VER oF No'tlCE oF D1SHONOR.-On the back of a 
promissory note there was a pfr1ted waiver of protest and notice of dishonor. 
Several persons at the same time, and before delivery of the note to the 
payee, indorsed their names in blank in regular order beneath the waiver. 
Held, §no "Of the Uniform Statute does not change the common law rule, and 
the waiver extends to all the indorsers alike. Central Nat. Bank of Ports-
111outli v. Sciotoville Milling Co., ·(W. Va. 1917), 91 S. E. 8o8. 
At common law notice of dishonor might be waived by a provision in the 
instrument itself or in the indorsement. If made in the instrument itse1£ it 
operated as a waiver as to all signers whether indorsers, makers, or payees. 
Dunnigan v. Stevens, 122 Ill. 3g6, 13 N. E. 651; Hoover v. McCormick, 84 
Wis. 21s, S4 N. W. sos; 8 C. J. 701, §g84, and cases cited .. If the waiver were 
written over the indcrsement and the instrument subsequently negotiated and 
indorsed the decisions are in conflict as to the effect of the waiver on the 
suhsequent indorsers. Those who indorse under the ,waiver must be assumed 
to have adopted the same, and are bound thereby. Bank v. Gold Mining Co., 
129 Cal. 263, 61 Pac. I077; Parshley v. Heath, 69 M~. 90, 31 Am. Rep. 246; 
Lo'l!eday v. Anderson, 18 Wash. 322, 51 Pac. 463; Bank v. Ewing, 78 Ky. 266, 
39 Am. Rep. 231. Where the waiver is written over an indorsement it is an 
individual waiver only, and not binding on those who do not expressly make 
themselves parties to it. Central Bank v. Davis, 19 Pick. 373; Woodman v. 
Thurston, 8 Cush. 15i; Duffy v. O'Connor, 7 Baxt. 498. DANIE!., NtGO't . 
. INS'tR., §1092a. If the waiver is written or printed on the back of the in-
strument before execution or indorsement and delivery to the payee it must 
be considered as a part of the instrument as much as if it had been written 
on the face as to all who indorse it before delivery, and all such are bound 
thereby. Baiik v. Gold Mining Co., supra; Bank v. Wilson, s App. (D. C.) 
.8; Johnson v. Parker, 86 Mo. App. 86o; Bank v. Ewing, supra. §no of the 
Uniform Statute provides "where the waiver is embodied in the instrument 
itself, it is binding on all parties; but where it is written above the signature 
of an indorser it binds him only." In the instant case it was contended that 
this section abrogated the common law rule, and that even though all the 
indorsers wrote their names in blank below the waiver at the same time and 
before delivery to the payee, yet the waiver applied only to the first indorser. 
It would seem clear that in such a case the waiver should be considered as 
a part of the original contract of all the indorsers-they are all of a kind, all 
having indorsed under exactly the same conditions-who should be treated 
as one indorser withi~ the second clause of §no. 
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CANC£!.LATION-0F Dr:£D FOR MISTAn ON p ART OF GRANTOR.-The defend-
ant company bought the land in question at a tax sale. It then discovered 
that the plaintiff railroad had a clair.1 upon the land, and instituted proceed-
ings to quiet title. The plaintiff company, relying on the advice of the state 
land commissioner to the effect that it had ·no title to the land in question, 
executed a quit claim deed to the defendant company. Then the plaintiff 
company discovered that it had title to the tract, and brought suit to cancel 
its deed on the ground of mistake. It was admitted that there was no fraud 
on the part of the defendant in procuring the quit claim deed, and the court 
found that the officers of the plaintiff company were not negligent in failing 
to discover, before the execution of the deed, that the plaintiff had an in-
terest in the land. Held, that the deed should be cancelled. Chicago, St. P., 
M. & O. Ry. Co. V. Washburn Land Co., (Wis. 1917), 161 N. W. 358. 
There is no part of our law in a more chaotic· condition than that dealing 
with mistake as a ground for relief or defense in equity. It is not strange 
that this is so, for practically every case raises a different and complex 
question upon the facts, and hence it is impossible to apply any hard and 
fast set of principles to all cases. It is well settled that not every mistake 
which would be sufficient ground for refusal to decree specific performance 
would authorize a court to rescind and annul a contract. Moffett, Hodg.kins 
Co. v. Rochester, i78 U. S. 373, 20 Sup. Ct. 957, 44 L. ed. no8. It is likewise 
settled law that a unilateral mistake is not ground for reforming a contract. 
Hearne v. Marine Ins. Co., :zp Wall. 488, 490; Fritz v. Fritz, 94 Minn. 264, 
102 N. W. 705. However, in case the relief asked is not reformation but 
rescission, most of the courts hold that, even if the mistake of fact is on the 
part of one party only, such relief may be granted. Wirsching v. Grand 
Lodge, 67 N. J. Eq. 7n, 63 Atl. n19; Moffett, Hodgkins & Co. v. Rochester, 
supra; contra, Thompson v. Dupont Co., IOO Minn. 367, III N. W: 302; Chute 
v. Quincy, 156 Mass. 189, 30 N. E. 550. In both of the latter cases the hard-
ship upon the plaintiff was not as great as in the principal case, in which th.ere 
was practically an instance of a person deeding away his property withou£ 
consideration. It is true that a voluntary deed will not be cancelled because 
of mere hardship to the grantor, Fretz v. Roth, 70 N. J. Eq. 764, 64 At!. 152; 
but in case the hardship is coupled with a bona fide mistake of one of the 
parties, a court of equity may rightly, as in the principal case, decree can-
cellation of the deed. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Powr:R OF CoNGRr:SS TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT.-
The petitioner, a District Attom~y of New York, whose conduct was being 
investigated by a sub-committ·ee "Of the House of Representatives of the 
United States, wrote a letter to the chairman of the sub-committee, which 
letter was also given to the press, making charges against the sub-committee 
''in language which was certainly unparliamentary and manifestly ill-tempered 
and which was well calculated to arouse the indignation not only of the 
members of the sub-committee but of those of the House generally." Upon 
the report of a select committee appointed to consider the subject, the peti-
tioner \va§ found guilty of contempt, a formal warrant for arrest was issued 
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and its execution by the Sergeant-at-Arms was followed by ·an application 
for habeas corpus. Held, that the House of Representatives had no power to 
punish the petitioner fqr contempt. Mar.shall v. Gordon, (Apr., 1917), 37 
Sup. Ct.-. 
Though early decisions seem doubtful on the subject (see E~ parte 
Nugent, 18 Fed. ~as. No. 10,375), it has long since been decided that neither 
branch of Congress has any general power to punish non-members for con-
tempt Such limited power as exists arises only by implication and rests 
upon the right of self-preservation-that is, the right to pre'{ent acts which 
in and of themselves obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative duty 
or the refusal to do that which there is an inherent legislative power to 
compel in order that legislative functions may be performed; and it is "the 
least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'' Ander.son v. Dunn, 6 
Wheat, 204; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. The principal case de-
cides that such implied power does not embrace punishment for contempt, 
as punishment, and J;ience that the House of Representatives had no power 
to imprison the petitioner for a contempt which "was deemed to result from 
the writing of the letter not because of any obstruction to the performance 
of legislative duty * * * but because of the effect and operation which the 
irritating and ill-tempered statement--; made in the letter would produce upon 
the public mind or because of the sense of indignation which it may ·be 
assumed was produced by the letter upon members of the committee and of 
·the House generally." The court is careful to point out that the legislative 
power to make criminal every form of act which can constitute a contempt 
to be punislied ac;cording" to the orderly process of law is not subject to the 
strict limitation applicable to tne accessory implied power to deal with par-
ticular acts as contempts outside of the ordinary process of law, citing In re 
Chapman, 166 U. s: 661. 
CoPYRIGR'l'.s-P:iiiu:oRMANCS FOR PR0F1T OF A Mus1cAL CoMPOSITioN.-The 
plaintiff was the owner of a copyrighted musical composition which was sung 
iii defendant's restaurant without permission. The music was furnished 
merely as entertainment to the diners, and. no admission fee was charged. 
The plaintiff sued defendant for infringement. The Circuit Court of Appeals 
had held that this was not a public performance for profit within the meaning 
of the COPYRIGHT ACT of March 4, 1909, (COMP. STAT. 1913, §g517). Held, 
that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed. Herbert 
v. Shanley, (1917), 37 Sup. Ct. 232. · 
For the first time the supreme court of the United States has passed upon 
the meaning of the words "publicly for profit" in the .COPYRIGHT ACT. The 
court of appeals in Herbert v. Shanfey Co., 229 Fed. 340, 143 C. C. A. 460, 
construed the a:ct as pertaining only to performances where an admission fee 
or some direct pecuniary charge is made. Justice HoLMJ;S, who delivered 
the opinion of the Supreme Court, has the support of the English case of 
Sarp-:,• v. Holland & Savage, [1909), 99 L. T. 317, in his proposition that the 
;;npsic is part of wh_at was paid for by the public. The learned justice says 
in ·~he principal case: "It is true that the music is not the sole object but 
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neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper elstwhere.. The 
object is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited powers of 
conversation or disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious p!ea'sure not to 
be had from eating a silent meal." In addition to the principal point in-
volved, it is p~ssible to conclude the courts' opinion as to two other 
matters. In the first place, it is not the wages of the musician that makes 
the performance one for profit, but rather the purpose :for which his employer 
engages him. 'fhus if a band is hired by a· public-spirited citizen to play in 
a park, the latter would not be guilty of an infringement of copyrighted 
music played. The court also intimates that it would. distinguish ·between a 
performance for profit and an eleemosynary one. For instance, a perform-
ance by a church choir would probably "be considered an eleemosynary one 
one rather than one for profit even if the music increased the attendance 
and in that manner swelled contributions. The principal case is a valuable 
one in the interpretation of this clause of the COPYRIGHT Ac:r, both as to the 
point actually decided and as to the other conclusions which may fairly be 
drawn from the opinion. 
CORPORATIONS-EFFJ>CT OF DECISION OP DIRttTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER THEIR Ac:r IS WITHIN THS EXPRESS OR IMPLn:D 
PowERs oF THS CoRPORATION.-The board of directors of defendant bank had 
entered into a contract with defendant X, who had for many years been 
president of the institution, by which they paid him $50,000, in retum for 
which he relinquished claims under the pension system of the bank and 
agreed, on his resignation, not to engage in the banking business with any 
other bank in tpe city for a certain period of time. Plaintiff, owning les\I 
than 1% of the shares of the bank, brings the present equitable action to 
have this contract set·aside. Held, that while the action of the directors and 
shareholders (who had both affirmed the pension plan) had no legal weight 
in determining the construction of the express powers of a cprporation, their 
judgment, while not conclusive, is entitled to consideration in determining 
whether t given action is within the implied powers of the corporation, and 
that shareholders of a national bank have incidental power to create a pension 
fund for the benefit of officers and employees. Heinz v. National Bank of Com-
merce, 237 Fed. 942, (C. C. A. I9I6). 
The authorities cited for this doctrine are MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING. 
§54i I MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS, §§67,87~; THOMPSON, COR-
PORATIONS, (2nd ed.), §§2Ioo-2I29. The sections cited in MoRSS and THOMP-
SON, neither in the text nor in the cases cited, give any direct support to the 
doctrine advanced In the instant .case. Nor, we submit, does the te:rt in 
MACHel'i". The last named author' does, however, give an effective discussion 
of the power of a corporation to dispense gratuities to its -servants, and in the 
English cases cited by the author we find ample authority for the doctrine of 
the instant case. Thus in Atty.-Gen. v. Great Eastern Ry., II Ch. D. 4&>, 
]AKES, L. J., says: "The majority of managing partners may be trusted, and 
ought to be trusted, in determining for themselves what they may do and to 
what extent they may go in matters directly connected with, or arising out 
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of, their business relations with others." In Hampson v. Price's Patent Candle 
Co., 45 L. J. Ch. 437, where it was decided that a bonus profit-sharing scheme 
approved by directors' ap.d sharehold~s' meeting of man~facturing corpora-
tion ~as intra vires .. Jtss:i;r., M~ R, says: "He [the judge] ought to consider 
that the manager and directors of the corporatiOn whose business it is, and 
whp ought to know how to conduct the business to the most advantage, ought 
to be.jlllowed to judge whether what is about to be done is £dvantageous and· 
reasonable or not." So in Henderson v. Bank of Australasia, 40 Ch. D. 170, 
which is almost on all fours with the instant case, in that gratuity to family 
of bank .nanager who had been killed in accident was sustained by· the court 
as sound business policy and within the province of the board. of directors, 
the preceding cases were cited and approved by NoRTH, J., who also dis-
tinguished Hutton v. West Cork Ry. Co., 23 Ch. D. 6s4, because the gratuities 
in that case were on the dissolution of the company. In re Iri.sh Provident 
Assurance CCI., [1913], I Ir. R. 3S2, is a modem case along the same line. 
There seem to be no other American cases which expressly recognize the 
doctrine of the instant case, though it seems ii). accord with the general trend 
of decisions in this country and may. be said to be tacitly recognized in the 
consideration actually_ given to the superior knowledge naturally possessed by 
directors concerning the conduct of the business of the corporation. 
CoRPORATioNs-RuusAx. To AcctPT ART1~i;:s oF INCORPORATION BtCAust 
OF UNCERTAINTY IN EVALUATION OF PATtNTS AS CoNSIDtRATION FOR STOCK.-
$()4,oso worth of the shares of the M. Calculator Co. were issued for patents 
controlling the special machine the corporation was incorporated to manu-
facture and sell. Under § 6, Art. 12, of the Constitution of Texas no shares 
of a corporation shall be issued except for "money paid, labor done, or 
property actually received,'' and under Arts. n26-n28 of Vernon's Sayles' 
Civil Statutes it is provided that so% of the stock of the corporation shall 
lie paid in, that the proi)erty given for the stock shall be described and 
evaluated and the descnption and evaluation sworn to by the incorporators. 
and that if the affidavits accompanying the articles fail to satisfy the Secre-
tary of State he may refuse to "receive, file and record" such articlCll until 
satisfactory evidence be forthcoming. In the instant case the Secretary cif 
State had refused to receive the articles on the ground that the evidence 
of the value of the patent rights was unsatisfactory as part of the requisite 
sq% paid up .stock; plaintiffs, applicants for the corporate charter, bring 
mandamus to compel the acceptance of the articles. Held, that it was within 
the discretion of the Secretary of State to refuse to receive the articles. 
B~ach et al. v. McKay, (Tex. 1917), 191 S. W. SS7· 
It was contended by the Secretary of State in this case that patent· rights. 
are never property which can be "actually received" within the terms of the 
Constitution. The court did not consider it necessary to pass on that· point, 
finding sufficient legal ground to hold against the relaters in the uncertain 
character of the value of any patent right and lack of power in the court to 
compel a discretional act by a state officer. The case is interesting, however, . 
in that many states, including Michigan, have simila'r requirements to those 
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of the Te.'Cas statute as to making affidavits of the value of property paid in 
for stock, and similar discretion reposed in the Secretary of State. Under 
such provisions it has been a matter of doubt for some time .to thoughtful 
lawyers who have been confronted with the problem of incorporating firms 
whose stock was to be largely issued for patents, as to the precise effect of 
the statutory provisions concerning valuation under oath of the property 
turned in for stock. The instant case does not tend to encourage those who 
would incQrporate with patent rights of more or less nebulous value as the 
principal asset of the corporation. The effect would be to give greater pro-
tection to creditors, but considering how many important companies, a source 
of profit to their shareholders and of benefit !o the community, have been 
launched almost entirely on the value of the patents assigned to them, it is 
doubtful whether there may not be a distinct loss from. a larger view. A 
Mic)ligan case along this line is discussed in 15 MICH. L. IU:v. 443. 
CORPORATIONS-\VHEN IS A CORPORATION A "f.1ANUFACTURING CORPORA-
TIOX"?-Art. 10. §3 of the iv!innesota Constitution provides for the statutory 
double liability of shareholders of a corporation "e~cepting those organized 
for the purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or mechanical 
business." A corporation was organized for the general purposes of manu-
facturing and furnishing electric current for light, heat and power, and, 
:iside from the usual accessory power to acquire land and water rights, was 
to furnish or supply electrical appliances, and also to conduct the business of 
"electrical contractors and electrical and mechanical engineers.'' In a suit 
to recover from the shareholders of this company under the statute, held, 
that the corporation was not a manufacturing company so as to come within 
the exemption. Goddard v. lost, (Minn. I9I7), I6I N. W. 223. 
The court states that a corporation for the manufacture and distribution 
of electrical rower is a manufacturing corporation, citing two Minnesota 
cases. One of these, Vencedor Inv. Co. v. Highland Canal & Power Co., 
125 Minn. 20, gives an excellent review of this point, and in connection with 
the note to Williams v. Warren, 72 N. H. 305, in 64 L. R A. 38, clearly 
shows that the weight of authority is with the statement of the l:tw made 
above. The power to manufacture and furnish electrical appliances is a 
common accessory power of electric light companies. The other two powers 
are clearly accessory to the main power already stated. That of holding 
lands for the charter purposes of the corporation has often been defined as 
an inseparable incident to every corporation. See I BLACKSTONE, COMM. 475 ;' 
Thomas v. Dakin, 22 ·vVend. I; Snell v. Chicago, I33 Ill. 4I3. The conferring 
of that power could hardly remove the company from the class of manufac-
turing corporations. There rem'ains only the power of doing business a:; 
contractors and engineers. This is clearly not manufacturing in its nature, 
and while it is as clearly a power entirely incidental to the main purposes 
of the corporation, it seems sufficient ground, possibly in conjunction with 
the power to manufacture and furnish electrical appliances, for the court 
to refuse to includ~ A. Co. within the exemption.• Reference to the five 
cases cited by the court as "interesting" in this connection shows how strong-
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is the policy of the Minnesota courts to prevent, if possible, the operation· 
of the exemption clause of the statute. Thus corporations manufacturing, 
packing and selling daiiy products; in general laundry business; allowed to 
manufacture, sell, use and lease machinery; allowed to manufacture and deal 
in azotin,e, etc. ; and manufacturing, purchasing and repairing plows and 
agricultural machinery were all held not to be manufacturing corporations 
so as to entitle their shareholders to the exemption of the Constitution. We 
assume, with some little hesitation, that a corporation empowered to manu-
facture, but in no way authorized to dispose of its product would be within 
the terms of the e..'Cemption as defined by the Minnesota courts. · 
DIV0Rci;;-Doi.uc1u~ AND Es'l'oPPl>L.-Defendant had been deserted by her 
husband in New York; plaintiff persuaded her to go to Nevada, establish a 
do.micile there, and get a divorce; which she did, receiving financial aid from 
plaintiff. Plaintiff and defendant were then married. Plaintiff now seeks 
to have the marriage annulled on the ground that the divorce in Nevada was 
void because defendant's first husband was not a resident of Nevada, had not 
been personally served, and did not appear. Helay that the Nevada decree 
migJit be reco-gnized in New York under interstate comity and that the plain-
tiff could not question a decree which he himself was instrumental in obtain-
ing. Kaufman v. Kaufman, (1917), 163 N. Y. Supp. 566. 
The New York courts have been little disposed to recognize divorce de-
crees granted in other states against residents of New York who were not 
personally served and who did not appear. · In O'Dea v. O'Dea, IOI N. Y. 
23, the wife deserted the husband, who moved to Ohio and secured a divorce 
from her. She married again and her second husband successfully .sued for 
annullment on the ground that the Ohio divorce· was not entitled to recog-
nition in New York. The United States Supreme Court reached a different 
conclllsion iri Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, where the divorce was 
granted by a court in the matrimonial domicile. Since the Atherton case two· 
New York cases, Nor!h v. North, 93 N. Y. Supp. 512, and Post v. Post, 133 
N. Y. Supp. 1057, (affirmed 210 N. Y. 607), have followed the Atherton case. 
In Post v. Post the court said that where the wife deserted the husband and 
moved to anothei; st;;tte the decision of the court of the state where the hus-
band remained w:ts wnclusive as to the jllstification of her leaving and would 
be entitled to full faith and credit, but where the husband movi;d to another 
state leaving the wlfe, the decision of the court where the husband goes is 
not conclusive, thus distinguishing Atherton v. Atherton, supra, and Haddock 
v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562. See P.erkins v. Perkins, (Mass), II3 N. E. 841, 
15 Mica L. Rev. 269, following Haddock v. Haddoc.k. But a different situa-
tion· is. raised when the wife has gone to another state and secured a divorce, 
her husband having deserted her. It is universally held that under such cir-
cumstances she may secure a separate domicile. Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 
(Me.) 140; Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213; Wacker v. Wacker, 139 N. Y. 
Supp. 78. But a decree so obtained by her in anotl;ier state has not been 
recognized in New York, provided the husband is a resident of New York. 
People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78. The court in the principal case held it did not 
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appear clearly that the husband was a resident of New York, and so the 
policy of New York did not forbid the recognition of the Nevada decree; 
and even if it did so appear, still the plaintiff was estopped to deny the 
validity of defendant's divorce. The holaings of the New York court in 
regard to recognizing a foreign divorce decree have placed it in a puzzling 
situation sometimes. In Re Swale's Estate, 70 N. Y. Supp. 220, the wife 
went to Illinois, got a divorca from her husband, came back to New York, 
married again and upon her first husband's death sued to get administration 
of his estate. Her second marriage was invalid by the laws of New York; 
yet it would be inconsistent to allow ·her, being the wife of another, to secure 
administration of her first husband's estate. The New York court solved 
the difficulty by holding that the wife, having secured the decree in Illinois, 
was aftenvards estopped to deny its validlty. For other .cases arising under 
like circumstances see In Re Fe)•h's Estate, 5 N. Y. Supp. go, Berry v. Berry, 
II4 N. Y. Supp. 497, Starbuck v. Starbieck, 173 N. Y. 503. The instant case 
goes a step further in holding that the plaintiff, who aided the wife in secur-
ing the decree, will also be estopped to deny its validity. · See also Kinnier 
v. Ki1111ier, 45 N. Y. 535. 
D1voRC1':-INDIANS.-Plaintiff's mother was a Sioux Indian who had been 
abandoned by her husband Alexis, a half-breed, about four years before plain-
tiff's birth. Plaintiff claimed certain land as heir of Alexis upon the ground 
that there had been no valid divorce between Alexis and his mother. Alexis 
could read and write, and looked and dressed like a white man, but was 
recognized as a member of the Sioux tribe and followed tribal customs when · 
he "bought" and married plaintiff's mother; under the samt!" customs, his 
later abandonment of her amounted to a valid divorce. Held, that a divorce 
by abandonment according to Indian customs, when the tribe is still treated 
by the Federal governmer1r as a distinct community, will be recognized by 
state courts. Ld Framboise v. Dd)•, (Minn. 1917) 161 N. W. 529. 
The Indian custom in regard to marriage consisted simply in living to-
gether as husband and wife; divorce was an agreement. to part, or abandon-
ment by one party of the other. Earl v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361. One case says 
there must be express words uttered in the present tense disclosing a meet-
ing of minds in order to constitute an Indian marriage. Henry v. Taylor, 
16 S. D. 424 But most authorities do not require that the elements of a 
common !aw marriage be· present. The question is simple when the mar-
riage or divorce takes place in Indian territory and both parties are Indians; 
it is held uniformly in such cases that the marriage or divorce is valid. 
Buck v. Branson, 34 Okl. 8o7; Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48; Earl v. Godley, 
supra. The principal case holds that a marriage and divorce between a half-
breed and Indian woman will be recognized although the half-breed acted 
and appeared like a white man and did not live on a resen·ation; 
the important fact was that he was recognized as a member of the tribe. In 
Cyr v. Walker, 29 Okl.-281, a white man \vho had been adopted by the Potta-
watomie Indians married a white wife in Illinois, and· after moving with her 
to an Indian reservation, abandoned her. It was held to constitute a divorcr. 
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The court in the principal case disapproves of this case as going too far, and 
the trend of Wells v. Thompson, 13 Ala. 793, is also contrary. Where a 
white man lives upon an Indian reservation and takes an Indian, woman and 
later abandons her, the proceeding has been upheld as marriage and divorce 
in several cases. Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo. 72; Boyer v. Dively, 58 Mo. 
510; La Riviere v. La Riviere, 77 Mo. 512. Such a marriage without a later 
divorce was recognized in Bank v. Sharpe, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 223, and Mor-
gan v. McGhee, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 13. In Re Wilbur's Estate, 8 Wash. 35, 
was attempted to be distinguished from these cases on the ground that a 
prohibitory state statute applied within the reservation. If both parties are 
Indians and move out of the reservation into a state proper and then attempt 
to dissolve the marriage relation by abandonment, the divorce will not be 
upheld. Connolly v. Woolrlch, II Lower Can. Jur. 197· If they remain after 
land has been allotted and state statutes have been applied a divorce accord-
ing to Indian custom will not be recognized. Moore v. N ah-con-be, 72 Kan. 
16g. Contra Kalyton v. Kalyton, 45 Ore. u6. 
HUSBAND AND \VlFE-CONTRACT FOR SERVICtS Rr:NDERED HUSBAND.-The 
husband had hired the plaintiff, his wife, to assist him in his work as a 
detective agreeing to pay her what her services were reasonably worth. 
The statute provided that a married woman might contract with reference 
to her property in the same manner and to the same extent as a married 
man and that sh~ should be entitled to her earnings. She sued to recover 
·from her husband's estate the value of her services to him. Held, that a 
married woman under an express contract with her husband may recover 
for extra or unusual services rendered him. In Re Cormick's Estate, (Neb. 
1916) 16o N. W. g89. 
The authorities are in considerable conflict upon the point raised in the 
instant case. Under most Married Women's Statutes the wife is entitled to 
her earnings .in her separate business or when she is in the employ of a 
third person. Carse v. Reticker, 95 Ia. 25; Peterson v. Mulford, 36 N. J. 
L. 481. All the authorities agree to the invalidity of a contract by ~ married 
woman to render services about the household, which she is duty bound to 
do. Michigan Trust Co. v. Chapin, lo6 Mich. 38.1, 58 Am. St. Rep. 490 and 
note. But H the wife has good cause for" divorce and, in consideration of 
money to be paid her for continuing her household duties, drops a divorce 
suit, the contract will be enforced. Phillips v. Meyers, 82 Ill. 67. The New 
York decisions are contrary·:to the principal case. In Blaechinska v. Mission 
and Home, 130 N. Y. 497, the plaintiff, a married woman, was employed as 
a s~mstress by her Jvtsband. She was injured through the negligence of 
the defendant and sued for the value of her services, which she could no 
longer perform. The New York Statute then provided that a married woman 
should be entitled to her earnings, but the court held she could not recover. 
In Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17, the wife agreed with her husband to care 
for his mother for $5 a week, and did so for eight years. The husba~d con-
veyed to her a tract of land in payment, and the deed was set aside as a 
frau_d upon creditors. See also Matter of Callister, 153 N. Y. 294 Even 
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under the latest New. York Statute, which provides that a married woman 
may make all contracts in regard to her property which an unmarried woman 
may make, and with any person, including her husband, the court held that 
she could not contract with him for her services even in an extraordinary 
or unusual employment. In Re Kaufmann, I04 Fed. 768. In New Jersey the 
statute provided that a married woman might bind herself by contract with 
any person in the same manner as if she were unmarried; it was held not 
to apply to a contract to act as saleswoman of a partnership of which her 
husband was 'a member. Turner v. Davenport, 61 N. J. Eq. 18. Contra 
Powers v. Fletcher, 84 Ind. 154. The Indian statute provicks that all the 
legal disabilities of a married woman are abolished except as othc:rwise pro-
vided; the court said that as it was not expressly provided that she might 
not contract with her husband to serve him, she might do so. Roche v. Union 
Trust Co., 52 N. E. 612 (Ind.) holds that a woman who clerked in a store 
for her husband under an express agreement might recover from the trustee 
for the benefit of creditors. The case of Nuding & Schlouch v. Ulrich, 169 
Pa. St. 289, holds that the wife might recover compensation under an express 
agreement to cook in her husband's restaurant. The statute in that case is 
similar to those in New York and New Jersey. 
INJUNCTION-RIGHT OF A M£MB£R OF TRAD£ UNION TO ENJOIN A WRONG-
FUI. EXPULSION.-Plaintiff, a member of the defendant union, was fined for 
an offense against the union; the fine was not, however, imposed in the 
manner required by the constitution of the union. Plaintiff was suspended 
for non-payment of the .fine, whereupon he appealed to the judicial board of 
the union, which informed him that according to the constitution he must 
pay his fine before the appeal would be heard; he brings an action for an 
injunction to prevent defendant union and its officers from refusing to treat 
him as a member and from refusing to accord to him the benefits incident to 
membership. Held, the injunction should be granted. Holmes, et al. v. Brown 
(Ga. 1917) 91 S. E. 4o8. 
In this case equity grants an injunction to protect a property right, i. e., 
the plaintiff's interest in the beneficiary and mortuary funds of the associa-
tion. While equity will not usually prevent the expulsion of a person from 
a purely social association, (W ellem1oss v. Grand Lodge, 103 Ky. 415, 45 
S. W. 36o; O'Brien v. Musical M. P. & B. U11io11, 64 N. J. Eq. 525, 54 
Atl. 150), it will prevent an expulsion when the complainant would be de-
prived of a ,property right thereby. Mesisco v. Giuliano, 190 Mass. 352, 76 
N. E. 907, Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. St. 107. But it is well settled 
that the plaintiff must first exhaust his- remedy within the association. Engel 
v. Walsh, 258 Ill. g8, IOI N. E. 222; Oliver v. Hopkins, 144 Mass. 175, IO 
N. E. 776; Harris v. Detroit Typographical Union, 144 Mich. 422, lo8 N. W. 
362. Some cases hold that a person is bound by the constitution regardless 
of the justice of the same, on the theory that the constitution and,rules of 
an association constitute a contract between the members, and while the pro-
vision might be invalid as a by-law passed without his assent, he is bound 
because he has agreed to it. Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, uo Cal. 297, 42 Pac. 
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887; Lawson v. Hewel, u8 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763. According to this "con-
tract" theory a person could be expelled by a proceeding which failed tCJo 
give any notice or even be bound by an agreement not to question the decision 
of the board by resorting to the courts. A better view seems to be the one 
evidently taken" by the court in the principal case, that equity will grant re-
lief against rules contrary to natural justice. People v. Uptown Assoc., 
9 App. Div. 191, Williamson v. Rundolph, ~ Misc. g6. Whether this pa.r-
ticular rule is contrary to natural justice or not, is a debatable question-the 
court assumes that it is, without discussion. Surely, however, there may be 
instances when a party should not be bound by unjust provisions in the con-
stitution, which he has probably never read and which was never intended'. 
as a contract. 
MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT.-Suit to annul a marriage on the ground that it 
was induced by the concealment of defendant that she was an incurable-
epileptic. No children were born of the marriage. Held, that the marriage 
should be annulled. McGill v. McGill, (1917) 164 N. Y. Supp.-. 
The Engl.ish courts which have jurisdiction over this subject have fol-
lowed closely the decrees of the e~clesiastical courts which they succeeded, 
and will annul a marriage only when there is fraud in the factum, or that 
sort of fraud which produces an appearance without a reality of consent. 
Moss v. Moss, L. R (1897) Prob. & Div. 263. The American courts, led 
by those of New York, have departed in varying degrees from this restricted 
view. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 6o5; Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158. The 
statute of New York, (§1730 Com> Crv. I'Roc.) which authorizes the annul-
ment of marriage for fraud, is in terms merely declaratory of the common 
law, and does ·not affect the question. The decisions in that jurisdiction have 
resulted from a greater liberality of view on the part of the courts, and not 
from legislation. Facts practically identical with those here given have been 
held to furnish insufficient grounds of annulment. Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 
124, 45 N. W. 323; Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, and to the same effect is the· 
recent case of Allen v. Allen, 85 N. J. Eq. 55, 95 Atl. 363, in which there was. 
concealment of h~reditary insanity. But in the latter jurisdiction, as in all 
others where the question has arisen, a venereal disease has resulted in 
annulment. Crane v. Crane, 62 N: J. Eq: 21, 49 Atl. 734; Smith v. Smith, 
171 Mass. 404, 50 N. E. 933. Why many of these courts give relief in some 
cases, and deny it in others where the fraud of the defendant is equally 
plain and the danger to succeeding generations probably greater, is not ap-
parent. Sobol v. Sobol, 150 N. Y. Supp. 2~, in which annulment was granted 
because the husband was shown to have tuberculosis, furnishes a proper 
stepping-stone to the instant decision. Both promote the best interests of 
society and work no injustice to the defendant. See 13 MICH. L. REV. 426, 
and 13 HARV. L. Rr:v. uo. 
· Pr,EADING-ExHmrrs AS PART OF COMPLAINT DEMURR!D To.-An action 
was brought against certain copartners and their bondsman, a corporation. 
The complaint failed to allege that the defendant bondsman was a corpora-
tion, but a copy of the bond sued on was attached to the complaint and 
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showed the incorporation of defendant. A demurrer to the complaint, based 
on the failure to allege incorporation, was overruled. Held, that the attached 
bond was such a part of the complaint that it was sufficient on demurrer. 
Sogn v. Koetzle, et al., (S. D. 1916) 160 N. W. 520. 
Pleading by way of exhibits, although known to the old equity practice, 
wa·s not known at common law. The authorities are not uniform in their 
holdings as to whether an instrument of writing annexed to the complaint, 
and alleged to be a part therepf, can be considered in determining the suffi-
ciency of the allegations of the complaint when a demurrer is interposed. 
6 ENc. Pr.. & PR. 299. The weight of authority probably supports the rule 
that in the absence of a statute the annexing and filing of papers as exhibits 
to a pleading does not make them a· part thereof. Stratton v. Henderson, 
26 Ill. 6g; Hadwen v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 13 Mo. 473; Larimore v. Wells, 
29 Oh. St. 13; Aultman v. Siglinger, 2 S. D. 442. It naturally follows that 
they cannot be referred to for the purpose of ;emedying the omission of a 
material allegation or curing a fatal defect. Hickey Co. v. Fugate, 143 Mo. 
·71; Burkett v. Grifiitlz, 90 Cal. 532; Wy1111e v. State Nat. Bank, 82 Tex. 378; 
Cave v. Gill, 59 S. C. 256. However, the court deciding the principal case 
repudiated the doctrine set forth above, and, referring to Ault111a11 v. Sigli11ger, 
cited supra, stated that its decision had long been disaffirmed in South Dakota 
and other states. The decision ·of the case under consideration is supported 
by authorities. Stephens v. A111eric01i Fire Ins. Co., 14 Utah 265; H11dson 
v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., no Ky. 722; Pefiey v. Jolznso11, 30 Neb. 
529. It should be noted that in spite of the conflict as to the value of an 
exhibit attached to a pleading demurred to, the courts quite generally agree 
that. exhibits may be looked to for definiteness and certainty of material 
allegations. 8 ENc. Pr.. & PR. 741. 
PROCESS-EX!illPTION OF WITNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY. -The 
managing agent of the defendant corporation was served in X County with 
summons, directed against the corporation, while passing through said county 
to attend court as a witness· in Y County. The defendant was a domestic cor-
poration located and doing business in Y County and its only representative 
in X County when the summons in question was served was the above men-
tioned agent. The plea attacking the jurisaiction was overruled, an excep-
tion to the ruling was .reserved, and, after a trial on the merits, judgment 
was given for _the plaintiff. Held, that the plea to the jurisdiction should 
have been sustained. Co111mo11wealth Cottoti Oil Co. v. Hudson, (Okla. 1916) 
161 Pac. 535. 
The legislature of Oklahoma has provided that "a witness shall not be 
liable to be sued in a county in which he does not reside, by being served: 
with a summons in such county, while going, returning, or attending in 
obedience to a subpoena." REv1sED LAWS 1910, ;15o64. In applying that 
statute to the facts of the case under consideration two important questions 
are presented, (1) does the exemption apply to the witness in his represen-
tative capacity? and (2) does the exemption exist outside of the jurisdiction 
of the court whose subpoena the witness is obeyirif? On a s_imilar state ~f 
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facts it has been held that the witness is exempt only in his personal capacity. 
Currie Fertilizer Co. v. Krish, (Ky.) 74 S. W. 268; Linn v. Hagan, I2I Ky. 
627, 87 S. W. IIOI; Breon v. Miller Lumber Co., (S. C.) 6s S. E. 2I4. 24 
L. R. A. N. S. 276. However, the weight of authori.ty apparently supports 
the holding in the principal case that the exemption applies to a witness in 
both his personal and representative capacities. Sewannee Coal, Coke & Land 
Co. v. Williams, I20 Tenn. 339, I07 S. W. g68; Mulhearn v. Press Pub. Co., 
53 N. J. Law IS3, 2I At!. I86, II L. R. A. IOI. See also 32 CYc. 493 and 
24 L. R. A. N. S., not~ On the second point, there appear to be only two 
reported cases which have held that a suitor or witness is not exempt from 
service while in an intermediate state en route to or from a trial. Holyoke 
Coal, Coke & Land Co. v. Ambden, SS Fed. S93, 2I L. R A. 3I9; Cronk v. 
Wheaton, IS Pa. Dist. Rep. 72I. On the other hand, the doctrine that such 
persons are exempt from service when in an intermediate state is supported 
by the decision of one case and the dictum of another. Lof ge v. Lowes, I3I 
Tenn. 626, I76 S. W. 106, L. R A. I9I6A 734; Barber v. Knowles, 77 Oh. St. 
8I, 82 N. E. Io6S, I4 L. R A. N. S. 663, II Ann. Cas. u# Further, the 
rule of the principal case as applied to intermediate counties is supported by 
authority. Tyro11e Bank v. Doty, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. ss8, I2 Pa. Co. Ct. 287; 
Hoffman v. Judge of Circuit Ct., II3 Mich. Iog, 7I N. W. 48o, 38 L. RA. 663, 
67 Am. St. Rep. 4s8. Thus it seems that the interpretation of the Oklahoma 
statute, while very liberal and extensive in its application, is in accord with 
the better reason and authority. For a discussion of the question. as to 
whether this defect in service was waived by pleading to the merits after 
the plea to the jurisdiction was overruled~ see tht: following note. 
PRoCEss-WAIV.ER OF DEFECT IN SERVICE BY PL"SADING To M'ERITS.-The de-
fendant corporation, after excepting to the order of the court overruling its 
plea to the jurisdiction, went to trial on the merits. Judgment was rendered 
for the plaintiff and an appeal taken. Held, that the defendant did not waive 
the jurisdictional objection by contesting the case on the merits. Com-
monwealth Cotton Oil Co. v. Hudso111 (Okla. I9I6) I6I Pac. S3S· 
The decisions of the various courts of the United States are in hopeless 
conflict on the question of waiver raised in the principal case. I6 L. R. A . 
. N. S. I77, note; L. R. A. IgI6E Io82, note. For a full discussion of the 
-question, see "PRESERVING A SPECIAL· APPEARANCE," 9 MICH. L. Rsv. 3g6. 
While it may seem incongruous to maintain that one can contest a cause on 
its merits and still not waive objections to the jurisdiction, yet it may be 
answered that it is hardly fair for a defendant to be deprived of the benefit 
of jurisdictional defects when he, in court under protest, defends himself 
under compulsion rather than suffer judgment by default. This is the reason-
ing on which the decision in the principal case was based. For a discussion 
of the precise jurisdictional question involved in this case, see the pre-
<:eding note. 
WILLS-EXTRAORDINARY STOCK DIVIDEND AS Rssmm:.-At the time of 
making her will, testatrix was the owner of 30 shares of stock in the Stand-
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ard Oil Company. Before her death this company, by virtue 01 a decree 
by the United States Supreme Court ordering its dissolution, distributed 
its holdings in subsidiary companies among its stockholders, and testatrix 
thereby became the owner of shares in 39 corporations, retaining at the same 
time the original 30 shares. The legatee of these shares claimed that this 
was a specific legacy which would be construed as of the time of the execu-
tion of the will, -and tliat the shares in the subsidiary companies, which when 
the will was drawn were held 'by the parent corporation and gave the primary 
shares their value, were part of her legacy. Held, that the shares were in 
effect an extraordinary dividend, which, having been declared during the 
life of the testatrix, passed to the residuary legatee. In re Brann (N. Y 
1917), II4 N. E. 404 
The question whether a legacy is adeemed upon the reorganization of a 
corporation and the reissue of stock by it, has· not often been before the 
courts. See COOK, CORP., §3o6. In Pope v. Hinkle3•, 209 Mass. 323, 95 N. E. 
768, the question was discussed, but it appears from the facts that the actual 
exchange of shares was not made until after the death of testator, though 
the agreement to reorganize and the dissolution of the old corporation were 
effected during the testator's life. In re Pierce, 25 R. I. 34, 54 Atl. 588, 
where there was a consolidation of several corporations, and in addition to 
the new stock issued a small cash payment wa$ made to "equalize values," 
comes to the same conclusion, that the legacy was not adeemed. In Turner 
v. Leeming, [1912] I Ch. 828, during the life of testator a corporation was 
dissolved and reorganized, and a bequest of IO shares was held not to have 
been adeemed, for the "subject matter remained, though changed in form 
and number," and the legatee was entitled to the 40 shares of stock (equal 
in par value) issued by the reconstructed company. See also Mallam v. Mc-
Fie. [.1912] I Ch. 29. But compare In re Slater, [1907] I Ch. 665, where 
it was held that a legacy of stock to the value of £1075 was adeemed upon 
the merger of one corporation into a second, when testator received shares 
in the second corporation valued at £3700, upon the grounds that this was not 
a substitution but an "extinction or annihilation of the original property." 
Brundage v. Brundage, 6o N. Y. 544, is cited by the court as authority for 
the decision in the principal case. In that case the stock issued between the 
time of making the will and the death of the testator might more truly be 
said to have been a dividend, for it represented earnings spent for improve-
ments; while in the principal case the distribution was of the assets of the 
parent corporation and part of the "essence of the original shares," which 
is evidenced by the fact that at the time of the death of the testator the 
value of the thirty shares had been diminished to the extent of one-third of 
their former value. The question whether a stock dividend is income to 
which the life-tenant is entitled, or is a part of the corpus which must be 
preserved for the remainderman, has frequently been the subject of litigation, 
which has resulted in a sharp conflict of authority. Matter of Osborne, 209 
N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723; see note in 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 768, to Holbrook 
v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 At!. 124; CooK, CORP., §§552-56o. 
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Wu.r.s-Rm'AINING SuRPr.us INCOME FoR Possmr.e FUTURE DEFICIENCY.-
A one-sixth share of the residuary estate was left upon trusts to pay out of 
the income an annuity of £1000, to the wife of the testator, and "subject 
thereto to permit the same sJiare to devolve under the provision for accruer" 
therein contained. The estate consisted largely of stocks and bonds, the 
income from which was ordinarily sufficient to provide for the annuity. But 
it was claimed by the widow that there was a possibility, on account of the 
war, of a dividend being passed, which would result in no funds to meet 
the annuity payment. The question presented was whether the trustees had 
the power to retain "the present surplus income to meet possible future 
deficiencies. Held, that the income should be used to satisfy the claims oi the 
annuitant to date, but beyond this it should be held according to the accruer 
declared by the will. Jn. Re Platt; Sykes v. Dawson, [I917] l Ch. -; 86 
L. J. Ch. II.f. 
The court in the instant case admits, and it is so held in this country, 
that where there has been a deficiency during certain years the annuitant 
is entitled to have the arrearages made up from the income during the subse-
quent years. Rudolph's Appeal, IO Pa. 34; Re Chauncey, II9 N. Y. 77, 23 
N. E. 448, 7 L. R. A. 361. In Walters v. Steele, 210 Pa. 219, 59 At!. 821, the 
annuitant claimed that the surplus of the fund from a judicial sale of lands 
to satisfy arrearage should remain in court to secure future payments, but 
the. court held that it was sufficient that the land was sold subject to this 
charge, while the surplus was awarded to the defendant in the execution. 
The· reason given was "the impossibility of computing the amount of future 
arrears." In a suit asking for the distribution of surplus rent, it was urged 
on behalf of the annuitant that the surplus should be' retained as a fund out 
of which any· deficiency in the rents to pay the annuity in any year should be 
made good. It was declared by the court that such did not appear to be 
the in.tention of the testator, and a distribution was ordered. In re Pierce, 
56 Wis. 560, 14 N. W. 588. The reason underlying the rule in this and the 
princiP.al case seems to be the desire of the court to settle the estate as early 
as possible; to insure the paym.ent of the annuity, but at the same -time to 
postpone as little as possible the enjoyment of the corpus by the ultimate 
donee. Harbin v. Masterman, [18g6] l Ch. 357; He11ders9n's Estate, 228 Pa. 
405, 77 At!. 634. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACCIDENT ARISING Ou'.!.' OF EMPLOYMENT.-
Deceased was an agent of respondent, ·and found it necessary to visit respond-
ent's London office; with respondent's knowledge and tacit consent he sailed 
for London on the Lusitania, which ship was sunk by a German submarine 
within the war- z(;'ne, and deceased was killed. Held, this is an accident aris-
ing out of the employment, and respondent is liable. Foley v. Home Rubber 
Co., (N. J. 1917) 99 At!. 624. . . 
The main contention of the respc;mdent. ·was that, as the attack was in 
violation of the law of nations, therlfore the act was not within the con-
templation of the respondent-when deceased undertook the risk. Burthe 
court held it immaterial w~ether "the ship was destroyed by lawful or un-
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lawful means; that respondent was charged with knowledge of the danger 
to belligerent ships, whether aware of the publication by Germany of the war 
z'One or not. As to what constitutes an "arising out of" the employment, 
there exists a flat conflict of authority. The English courts, and a few of 
our courts, hold that the injury must result from a special danger or risk, 
and not such as the public in general assume. Under this view no recovery 
could be had, as deceased was assuming no greater risk because of his c;m-
ployment than the hundreds of others on the ship. But the New Jersey court 
here, as previously, chose the broader doctrine, holding it sufficient if the in-
jury arises out of work or business being done for the master, either by 
direct or implied authority. For discussion of this point see 15 MICH. L. Rsv. 
92. A sharp conflict also exists as to the extra-territorial effect of the Com-
pensation Acts, where, as here,, no provision on that point is contained. The 
English, Massachusetts, Michigan and Wisconsin courts deny them any extra-
territorial effect, apparently fearing the result of a conflict of laws. Gould's 
case, 215 Mass. 48o, 102 N. E. 6g3; Keyes-Davis Co. v. Allerdice, Mich. 
Ind. Acc. Board, (1913) '; Schwart:; v. Telegraph Co., (1912) 2 K B. 299. 
But Ohio and New Jersey hold the contrary view, basing it on legislative, 
intent, and also on the theory that the law of the place where the contract 
was made should govern the relations between the employer and employe 
wherever they may be. Deeny v. Wright, etc. Co., 36 N. J. Law J. 121. Re 
Edward Schmidt, Claim No. 6, Ohio St. Lia. B'd Aw'd, (1912). For discus-
sion of this point see 14 l\11cH. L. IU;v. 524-
